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Preferred Communications: Preamble to
Breakup of Local Cable Franchising?
Sol Schildhauset
In this Article, Mr. Schildhause, whose law firm represents Pre-
ferred Communications in the assault on local cable franchising
practices as violative of the first amendment, suggests that the
Supreme Court decision in City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Com-
munications, Inc. confirms serious doubts about the survivability
t Sol Schildhause is the Washington partner in the law firm of Farrow, Schildhause
& Wilson, with offices in Washington, D.C. and Oakland and Los Angeles, California.
The firm was intimately involved with the development of cable's copyright accommoda-
tions in the early and mid-1970's, was prominent in the achievement of pole attachment
legislation in California and at the federal level, and is now in the forefront of the move-
ment to achieve first amendment status for cable television. The firm has been success-
fully litigating the Preferred Communications case against the City of Los Angeles.
Mr. Schildhause is a graduate of Harvard Law School. He was, until 1974, the first
Chief of the Cable Television Bureau at the Federal Communications Commission where
he directed the FCC's cable television operations dating from the time the Commission
first assumed direct jurisdiction over the industry in 1966 until after the 1972 Report
that began to date the emancipation of cable. He has been a staunch advocate of the
promise of cable television and has participated in most of the bruising battles that have
beset the industry.
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of the core of local franchising and of many of the substantive
features of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.
I. Introduction
The terms of cable television franchising are currently
among the key issues in telecommunications. With most of the
country already wired or franchised,1 the awarding of franchises
for new uncabled territory is just about over; nonetheless, the
same issues abound in renewing franchises (with modification of
franchise terms possible) and thousands of existing licenses are
coming up for renegotiation during this decade.
In virtually every community in the country, cable systems
receive a monopoly franchise from local governments. It is in
fact a monopoly, even though it is almost always decorated with
the sham label of "non-exclusive franchise." ' In return' for the
exclusive right to sell cable television service, communities im-
pose a panoply of regulatory controls and extract substantial
franchise fees, a process that amounts to discriminatory taxa-
tion, if not outright kickback. This cozy arrangement has been
described as one in which "viewers are ... stuck with whatever
cable system the politicos pick for them."'3
The existing dubious procedures for cable franchising and
refranchising will undoubtedly be altered as a result of the deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles
v. Preferred Communications, Inc." That case poses a direct
challenge to the right of local governments to exercise monopoly
power over cable television through the device of limiting access
to the market, and it also threatens a number of the comfortable
legislative compromises that were built into the Cable Commu-
nications Policy Act of 1984.1
1. About 75% of all U.S. television households were passed by cable as of December
31, 1985. PK Cable TV Franchising, June 25, 1986, at 8. Apparently not reflected above
are such franchised but not built-out major areas as Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Balti-
more, Washington, D.C., Sacramento, Philadelphia, and the boroughs of New York City
outside Manhattan.
2. CATO Institute, Policy Analysis, Mar. 13, 1984, at 4 [hereinafter CATO
Institute].
3. The Nature of Cable, Wall St. J., June 5, 1986, at 26, col. 1.
4. 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
5. 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. III 1985).
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This Article addresses aspects of the continuing, though
shifting, struggle between local government franchising authori-
ties, entrenched cable interests, and clamoring new cable as-
pirants, all viewed in a context of evolving judicial concern and
cast against the background of a light that may fail - the
Cable Communications Policy Act.
II. Preferred Communications Dispute: Prototype of a
Franchising Experience
The franchise selection process for the south central area of
Los Angeles, principally including the Watts area, began in Oc-
tober of 1982, with the city soliciting applications by publishing
a "Notice of Sale of a Cable Franchise and Request for Propos-
als and Instructions to Applicants." The notice specified that
only one franchise would be awarded.' The bidding process was
later described by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as
follows:
The City allocates franchises through an auction process....
The City requires companies wishing to participate in the process
to submit to a variety of conditions. A potential bidder must pay
a $10,000 filing fee and a $500 good faith deposit and must agree
to pay up to an additional $60,000 to reimburse the City for ex-
penses incurred in holding the auction. It must provide the City
with a detailed proposal outlining its intended operations over
the succeeding nine years and must demonstrate to the satisfac-
tion of the City that it has a "sound financial base," that its pro-
posed operations constitute "sound business plans," and that it
has the proper "character qualifications" and "demonstrated bus-
iness experience." The City also requires hopeful bidders to agree
to pay the City a percentage of future annual gross revenues and
to provide a variety of customer services, including at least 52
channels of video service and interactive (two way) service.
More significantly, the City exacts a commitment to provide
various mandatory access and leased access channels. Bidders
must agree to provide, without compensation, two channels for
use by the City and by other government entities, two channels
for use by educational institutions, and two channels for use by
the general public, along with staff and facilities to aid in pro-
6. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2034, 2035-36
n.1 (1986).
1986]
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gramming. Bidders must further agree to provide two leased ac-
cess channels as well. An undertaking to provide portable produc-
tion facilities and to permit free use by the City of all poles,
towers, ducts, and antennas is also required.
Finally, potential cable operators must agree to leave a vari-
ety of business decisions to the discretion of the City. Pricing and
customer relations are left to the City's control. The operator
must form a "cable franchise advisory board," subject to City ap-
proval. Lastly, the City reserves the right to inspect the cable op-
eration upon demand and requires a waiver of any right to re-
cover for damages or other injury arising from the cable franchise
or its enforcement.7
Preferred Communications did not enter the bidding con-
test but later sought a franchise as a matter of right. Its request
was denied. Preferred then sued in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California, contending that the
city's refusal to grant its request for a franchise violated both
the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution and va-
rious federal antitrust laws. Plaintiff, Preferred Communica-
tions, alleged that: 1) it had asked the City's Department of
Water and Power and the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
Company for permission to lease space for cable television on
existing poles and in the utility conduits; 2) the utilities stated
that they would not lease space until Preferred Communications
obtained a franchise from the city; and 3) Preferred Communi-
cations sought a franchise but was turned down by the city be-
cause Preferred Communications had refused to participate in
the auction for the right to be the sole cable television operator. 8
III. Tracking Preferred Communications from District Court
to Supreme Court
The district court dismissed the complaint. As to the first
amendment claim, the court stated: "The City's regulatory
scheme, which herein has had the effect of regulating access to
the erection, construction, and operation of a cable television
system, does not, as a matter of law, violate the First Amend-
7. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1400-01
(9th Cir. 1985).
8. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. 2034, 2035 (1986).
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ment rights of an alleged prospective cable television operator
such as plaintiff ..... ", The court further found that the defend-
ants"0 were immune from antitrust liability because their con-
duct was state action under Parker v. Brown."
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part
and reversed in part. 2 The district court's conclusion that de-
fendants were immune under the federal antitrust laws was up-
held. As to the free speech claims, Preferred Communications
had contended that its right to construct a cable television sys-
tem and to disseminate programming should not be conditioned
on having to participate in an auction procedure or be otherwise
subject to the city's discretion."3 The complaint alleged, inter
alia, that there was space on the poles, that Preferred Communi-
cations was ready and willing to abide by all reasonable police
power regulations of the city, that cable placed no greater bur-
den on public rights-of-way than did newspapers, movie thea-
ters, and other first amendment speakers, and that Preferred
Communications was eager to compete for viewers with any
other cable operator.'4 The Ninth Circuit held that, taking the
allegations in the complaint as true,' 5 the city's refusal to issue a
franchise to Preferred Communications amounted to a violation
of the first amendment to the Constitution. The court rejected
the claim by defendants that the decision to limit the number of
franchises could be justified by physical limitations of space on
9. CV-83-5846-CBM (C;D. Cal. Mar. 8, 1984). The district court opinion is unre-
ported. See also Amici Curiae Brief for the United States and the FCC at 13, City of Los
Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986) (No. 85-390) (describ-
ing the reasoning of the district court as "skeletal").
10. The defendants are the City of Los Angeles and the Department of Water and
Power.
11. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
12. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th
Cir. 1985). An order amending the Ninth Circuit's opinion and denying a petition for
rehearing was entered on June 13, 1985. The order noted that "no judge of the court has
requested a vote on the suggestions for rehearing en banc."
13. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1401.
14. Id. at 1401-11.
15. Id. at 1399. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) a defense to a complaint may be
entered by way of a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted." But, as the Ninth Circuit noted: "In conducting this review, we must accept
all material allegations in the complaint as true." Id. at 1399 (citing Berner v. Lazzaro,
730 F.2d 1319, 1320 (9th Cir. 1984)).
1986]
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the poles and in the conduits. The defendants' claim that the
refusal to issue a second franchise was justified because cable
television is a natural monopoly also failed.16 The court noted
that these justifications were contradicted by allegations in the
complaint and thus could not be invoked to justify the conduct
of the defendants at this stage of the proceeding.17
The Ninth Circuit decision stands, however, as something
more than a slim triumph on procedural grounds because the
court went on to express its strong inclination to view cable tele-
vision as a form of publishing very much like newspaper pub-
lishing. Thus, relying heavily on Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,18 the court declared that: "Allowing a procedure such
as the City's would be akin to allowing the government discre-
tion to grant a permit for the operation of newspaper vending
machines located on public streets only to the newspaper that
the government believes 'best' serves the community, a practice
which we find clearly invalid."19
The justification for local franchising practices is customa-
rily couched in these terms: cable systems use property held for
the benefit of the public, and the use of public right-of-way is
comparable to the use of spectrum by broadcasters (a use that is
classically perceived as justifying FCC regulation of broadcast-
ing2"); there are "some" physical scarcity limitations on the
number of cables that can be accommodated in the public right-
of-way; cable "feels" more like broadcasting than newspaper
publishing; construction of a cable system entails a far more dis-
ruptive use of the public domain than does the distribution of
newspapers; and there is no tradition of completely unfettered
speech in the medium of cable as there is in the case of
newspapers.2"
16. Id. at 1404-11.
17. Id. at 1401-10.
18. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The Supreme Court invalidated a state statute granting
political candidates a right to equal space to reply to criticism in newspapers. The Court
refused to accept a contention that, by virtue of the circumstance that economic condi-
tions assure most newspapers a monopoly position in their markets, government could
for that reason impose a right of access.
19. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1409.
20. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
21. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES & U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, CABLE FRANCHISING
AND REGULATION: A LOCAL GOVERNMENT GUIDE TO THE NEW LAW at III-Q-4-5 (1985)
[Vol. 7:1
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Although the Ninth Circuit's decision was not a complete
rebuttal to the above, the opinion went a long way in con-
fronting the standard arguments for regulation. The pole space
analogy to broadcast spectrum was rejected.22 While the eco-
nomic scarcity or natural monopoly characteristics of cable as
justification for regulation was not decided, the tone of the opin-
ion did not denote any significant degree of sympathy with that
contention.2" The argument that the disruptive effects of a sec-
ond cable system justifies the restricting of access also failed.2
The Ninth Circuit did not reject traditional cable franchis-
ing as inherently unconstitutional, nor did it categorically de-
clare that cable is entitled to the same first amendment protec-
tions that are applicable to newspaper publishing. However, it
drew parallels between cable and newspaper publishing and de-
clared that "[airranging programming for an entire cable televi-
sion system entails engaging in a wide variety of protected activ-
ities."28 Furthermore, "[iin addition to originating their own
programming, cable television operators exercise considerable
editorial discretion regarding what their programming will
[hereinafter CABLE FRANCHISING AND REGULATION] (This guidebook was produced for the
benefit of mayors, council members, cable adminstrators, city attorneys, and other local
officials.).
22. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404. Here the court stated:
We cannot accept the City's contention that, because the available space on
such facilities is to an undetermined extent physically limited, the First Amend-
ment standards applicable to the regulation of broadcasting permit it to restrict
access and allow only a single cable provider to install and operate a cable televi-
sion system.
23. Id. at 1404-05 ("Although the Court [in Tornillo] acknowledged that most news-
papers enjoy a monopoly in their areas of distribution, it did not conclude that this
circumstance gave rise to a duty to provide public access to the press.").
24. The Ninth Circuit maintained that:
Cable television . . . requires the use of public facilities, and this provides a
justification for some government regulation. The City has legitimate interests in
public safety and in maintaining public thoroughfares . ...
Regulating such use and inconvenience, however, is quite different from re-
stricting access, as the City attempts to do here. It has not been alleged that pub-
lic utility facilities owned or controlled by the City can only support the use of a
single or a few cables. Indeed, PCI [Preferred Communications] has alleged pre-
cisely the contrary, A different and more sharply focused response by the City
could protect the legitimate interests of the City and its citizens.
Id. at 1406 (citation omitted).
25. Id. at 1410.
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include."26
The court specifically declared that cable television requires
the use of public facilities and that such a feature "provides a
justification for some government regulation. '27 Inter alia, plain-
tiff Preferred Communications conceded that cities have author-
ity to regulate cable within the limits of their police power.2"
This is significant in light of the court's observation with respect
to § 621(a)(1)29 of the Cable Communications Policy Act (the
Cable Act) which empowers a local authority to "award ... 1 or
more franchises":
To the extent that this provision authorizes the government
to protect its interest in regulating disruption of public resources
through a system of permits or franchises, see id. § 621(a)(2)
(noting government's interest in promoting safety and in ensuring
that the costs of installation and operation are borne by the cable
operator); see also id. § 602(8) (defining "franchise" as an initial
authorization (or a renewal thereof), whether designated as a
franchise, license, permit, or otherwise), it passes muster under
the principles announced here. But we cannot agree with the sug-
gestion in the legislative history that the provision "grants to the
franchising authority the discretion to determine the number of
cable operators to be authorized to provide service in a particular
geographic area." H.R.Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 ....
A construction of such breadth would be invalid.30
The court's reference to local concerns with public safety ap-
pears to be more than casual and seems approving of the plain-
26. Id. at n.10. The court continued that:
Editorial judgment is entitled to First Amendment protection. See, e.g.,
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-58, 94 S. Ct. 2831,
2839-40, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974). Undeniably, cable operators do transmit programs
produced by others. To the extent an operator does so, however, we believe it
would be treated for First Amendment purposes as would be theater owners,
booksellers, and concert promoters. Their First Amendment protection is not di-
minished because they distribute or present works created by others.
Id.
27. See supra note 24.
28. This police power is generally understood to be concerned with such matters as
protecting health and safety. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1406.
29. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 621(a)(1), 98
Stat. 2779, 2786 (1984). This section is now codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(al(1) (Supp. III
1985).
30. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1411 n.11.
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tiff's own position on the extent of the municipal police power to
regulate cable.
The court also addressed the contention that the disruption
that cable visits on the public domain justifies a greater degree
of regulation than does the distribution of newspapers." Its
opinion would accept some regulation but clearly not the
amount contemplated in the typical franchise contract. Com-
monly, most of the consideration of disruption proceeds from an
intuitive sense that accepts the notion that cable is obviously a
greater burden on public facilities than is the newspaper busi-
ness; but that assumption may be unwarranted. Counsel for Pre-
ferred Communications offered evidence that newspaper distri-
bution is, by a wide margin, a greater burden than is cable
television. 3
The relevance of the traditional argument in favor of mu-
nicipal restraints - that cable has always been regulated and
newspapers have not - also received gruff treatment from the
Ninth Circuit. The court noted that: "The Tenth Circuit also
suggested that newspapers had enjoyed a long tradition of free-
dom from government interference, while cable television had
not. Community Communications Co., 660 F.2d at 1379; accord
Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island, 571 F.Supp. at 985. This
distinction merely begs the question." '3 That reflection of the
Ninth Circuit appears beyond dispute. Reliance on a long-term
pattern of conduct to justify ratifying the process even if it is
unconstitutional is thin and illogical. It seems reasonless because
it would approve the creation of an incentive for government to
move in early to regulate every new medium of communications
as it surfaces.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion merits a final overall look. At
the outset, the court framed a "fundamental issue" in terms
which, if decided in favor of the city, would require affirmation
of the district court; but "which, if decided adversely to the
31. Id. at 1405-06.
32. BROBECK CORP., ATHERTON-MENLO PARK-PALo ALTO JOINT CABLE SYSTEM STUDY
(1984). This document was submitted as exhibit 4 to Appellant's Response to the Amici
Curiae Brief of the Cities of Palo Alto, Menlo Park and Atherton, and is a study outlin-
ing public sector costs for newspapers and cable TV, the continuing litter problem being
a major consideration in the higher costs attributable to newspapers.
33. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1405 n.8.
1986]
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City, would require reversal and a redesign by the City of its
procedures relating to cable television. 's4 The court identified
that fundamental issue as follows:
Can the City, consistent with the First Amendment, limit ac-
cess by means of an auction process to a given region of the City
to a single cable television company, when the public utility facil-
ities and other public property in that region necessary to the in-
stallation and operation of a cable television system are physically
capable of accommodating more than one system?3s
In saying "no" to that question, the court was plainly sig-
nalling that it expected the city to redesign its procedures con-
cerning cable television. The Supreme Court's opinion3" did not
go that far and, for that reason, is being hailed by the apparatus
of local government regulators as a victory for the continuation
of business as usual at city hall. s7
IV. Supreme Court Decision: A Standoff Or a Win for Cable?
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case to the district court.
An opinion by Justice Rehnquist expressed the unanimous view
of the Court that the cable television company's complaint
should not have been dismissed because the activities in which it
sought to engage plainly implicated first amendment interests. 8
But the Court did not think it was desirable to express any more
detailed views on the proper resolution of the first amendment
question without a more thoroughly developed record of pro-
ceedings in which the parties would have an opportunity to
prove the factual assertions on which they rely.3 9
34. Id. at 1401 (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
37. Tentative Move Toward Cable's First Amendment Rights, BROADCASTING, June
9, 1986, at 36. (Quoting Los Angeles Assistant City Attorney: "[Wle're going to win....
The Supreme Court didn't tell us not to continue with the competitive bid process.").
38. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2034, 2037
(1986). Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and O'Connor, wrote a concurring
opinion in which he states that he joined the majority opinion on the understanding that
it leaves open the question of the proper standard for judging first amendment chal-
lenges to local government restriction of access to cable facilities. Id. at 2038 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
39. Id. at 2037.
[Vol. 7:1
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The plaintiff cable company is surely entitled to claim vic-
tory because the right to trial on its original complaint - all it
ever sought - is now assured. The opposing side will find ref-
uge, however, in the fact that although the Supreme Court
agreed with the court of appeals that the complaint should not
have been dismissed, its affirmance was "on a narrower
ground."4 0 Is affirmance "on a narrower ground" a repudiation
of the lower court? That question must be viewed in light of the
course taken by the Supreme Court and in anticipation of its
effect on subsequent proceedings.
As presented to the Supreme Court, as was the case before
the Ninth Circuit, the record consisted only of the plaintiff's
complaint. For the purposes of the district court, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, and the Supreme Court, every allegation of the complaint
was deemed to be true.' Thus, because the matter before the
Supreme Court was to review the action of the Ninth Circuit,
which had reversed the decision of the district court granting a
motion to dismiss, the options available to the Supreme Court
were limited. It could have chosen to reverse the Ninth Circuit
and to reinstate the decision of the district court. There were no
votes for that. It could have decided that certiorari was improvi-
dently granted and dismissed the appeal without opinion; this
would have left the Ninth Circuit's decision in place but without
the imprimatur of Supreme Court affirmation. No one proposed
that in either the majority or concurring opinion. It could have
affirmed, but at the same time indicated its lack of confidence in
the Ninth Circuit by ordering that its opinion not be treated as
precedent, either within or without the Ninth Circuit. There was
no support for that. It could have affirmed the Ninth Circuit and
sent the case back to the lower court for trial, in effect not de-
tracting from the published opinion of the Ninth Circuit.42 All
40. Id. at 2036.
41. Id. at 2037. See also supra note 15.
42. In federal practice, a circuit court opinion does not lose precedential value un-
less reversed by the Supreme Court, and then only as to the issues that led to the rever-
sal. Federal circuit court opinions are routinely cited for matters that were not touched
by a reversing opinion. Thus, a standard citation for the subsequent history of a federal
case is "rev'd on other grounds." See HARVARD LAW REVIEW ASS'N, A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION § 10.7.1, at 49-50 (14th ed. 1986). Supreme Court practice expressly recognizes
this fact. When the Court wants to deprive the circuit court's opinion of precedential
value, it vacates the circuit court's judgment. For example, in Lawlor v. National Screen
19861
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nine justices voted for that.
The litigation then is back to the district court, but not in
the same posture. The prospective trial in the district court is
now restrained by the appellate rulings that the services of cable
television "plainly implicate First Amendment interests. 43 The
Supreme Court opinion declined to address whether the threat
of visual blight or other aesthetic interests, the possibility of
traffic disruption, or the prospect of the local-monopoly nature
of cable television justified government limits on the number of
cable systems or other forms of regulation. However, the idea
that cable could be regulated under some rule of reasonableness,
that perhaps applies to non-speech activities, was rejected. As a
minimum, the Court declared that governing communities must
make a showing that regulation advances governmental inter-
ests. Thus, "where speech and conduct are joined in a single
Serv. Corp., 352 U.S. 992 (1957), the Court in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion
granted certiorari solely to vacate the Third Circuit's opinion so that the issues decided
by the circuit court, which the qourt deemed unnecessary for the decision, would not be
binding on the district court. The Court stated:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the motion for summary judgment
should have been denied. However, in our view, this disposition of the case made
it unnecessary for the Court of Appeals to pass on any other issue than that of the
per se invalidity of exclusive contracts under the Sherman Act. In order that the
District Court not be bound by the consideration the Court of Appeals gave to the
remaining issues, and without reaching any of the same, we grant the petition for
writ of certiorari, vacate the judgments, and remand the cause to the District
Court for trial.
Lawlor, 352 U.S. at 992 (emphasis added).
Likewise in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), where the Fifth Circuit had
affirmed a district court's decision without the benefit of the Supreme Court's recent
decision on qualified immunity in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), the Court
vacated the circuit court's judgment. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 577. "Of necessity our deci-
sion vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court's opinion of prec-
edential effect, leaving this Court's opinion and judgment as the sole law of the case." Id.
at 577-78 n.12 (emphasis added). It is therefore clear that when the Supreme Court af-
firms a circuit court's judgment and does not vacate it, the circuit court's opinion re-
mains both valid precedent and law of the case. That being so, the Ninth Circuit's Pre-
ferred Communications opinion is not displaced by the Supreme Court's affirmance.
And, since the Supreme Court's opinion nowhere expressly disapproves of anything
stated in the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the latter remains the law of the Ninth Circuit and
binding as precedent and law of the case on the district court on remand in Preferred
Communications.
43. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2037.
44. Id. But cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (preven-
tion of aesthetic harm is a substantial governmental interest).
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss1/1
19861 PREFERRED COMMUNICATIONS
course of action, the First Amendment values must be balanced
against competing societal interests. ' 4 5 The opinion is unusually
candid in its admission that the Court does not know enough
about how cable is installed on utility poles, stating that: "We
think that we may know more than we know now about how the
constitutional issues should be resolved when we know more
about the present uses of the public utility poles and rights-of-
way and how respondent proposes to install and maintain its fa-
cilities on them. '46
V. Local Government Involvement
The potential of cable, sometimes described as "breathtak-
ing," is also characterized as inhibited by a long history of re-
45. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2038. PK Cable TV Law Reporter,
June 13, 1986, at 2 states:
This suggests that the court is leaning toward the O'Brien test [United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)] to balance cable's right to enter a market against
a city's aesthetic interests.
If so, then franchising requirements will be upheld only if. they further an
important governmental interest, and if the incidental restriction on the First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
46. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2038. In both the Ninth Circuit and
Supreme Court opinions there is a common thread of apparent acceptance of the pro-
position that the stringing of cable on poles is somehow a use of streets and rights-of-
way, that use being the anchor justification for local government intervention in cable
franchising. In another view, however, the attaching of cable to utility poles is simply a
matter of accepting a public utility service offered by common carriers (power and tele-
phone companies) who long ago dedicated their property and have over a long period of
time willingly offered the service to cable companies. In that light, pole attachment ser-
vice is viewed as available to a cable operator as is ordinary telephone service to any
telephone user. And, the argument runs, the cable operator does not use streets and
rights-of-way any differently than does the ordinary telephone user. That position was
argued in the Supreme Court by counsel for Preferred Communications (see PK Cable
TV Law Reporter, May 21, 1986 at 2) and is also contended for in an amici curiae brief
(Amici Curiae Brief of Nor-West Cable Communications and Preferred Communications,
Inc., FCC v. Florida Power Corp., Nos. 85-1658 and 85-1660.). In the case of Florida
Power Corp., the Supreme Court, on December 3, 1986, heard argument on an appeal
from a decision of the Eleventh Circuit that held unconstitutional the federal statute in
47 U.S.C. § 224 (1982) that regulates pole attachment rates and practices. Florida Power
Corp. v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 778 F.2d 793 (11th Cir. 1985). The
opinion by Justice Rehnquist in Preferred Communications may be prescient in its per-
ception that the Court will be better able to decide the constitutional questions in
franchising when it knows more about pole attachment practices.
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pression at the federal and local levels of regulation.47
At the federal level, the cable industry was subjected to a
roller coaster of regulation by the FCC. The Commission's atti-
tude toward cable has been described as one of little interest in
the 1960's to one of extensive engagement in the 1970's at the
importuning of the broadcast industry, and back to "minimal"
regulation in recent years.' 8 Beginning in early 1966, the FCC
had clamped a freeze on cable that effectively kept it out of the
major population centers, permitting it a kind of free growth in
the areas of the country that were less served by over-air broad-
cast television.' 9 The assigned reasons - to preserve the broad-
cast television structure because the poor could not afford cable
and because cable would jeopardize broadcast television and not
wire every market - were perhaps less a sign of protectionism
than a manifestation of an unreadiness to deal with new techno-
logical developments. The Commission was not prepared for the
impact of cable and did not know what to do about it.50 As a
result, the agency imposed the equivalent of a freeze while it
spent the next decade groping for a solution. The freeze lasted
until 1972 when a thaw emerged in the form of the Cable Televi-
sion Report and Order51 that blueprinted the more recent
phases of cable's evolvement.
The federal agency presence has abated.52  Now, it is said,
47. See CATO Institute, supra note 2. See also, Remarks by Anne P. Jones, Com-
missioner of FCC, in Washington, D.C. 2 (Oct. 29, 1982) ("[T]he Commission [FCC]
deliberately regulated this technology [cable] in such a way as to hinder its
development.").
48. 2 N. JESUALE, R. NEUSTADT & N. MILLER, CABLE TELEVISION INFORMATION CENTER
CABLEBOOKS: A GUIDE FOR LOCAL POLICY (1982) [hereinafter A GUIDE FOR LOCAL POLICY].
49. Second Report and Order in Docket 14895, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
50. Report and Order in Docket 20988, 48 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 171 (1980). See
also, Remarks of Tyrone Brown, Commissioner of FCC, in Anaheim, Cal. 3 (Dec. 7,
1978).
51. 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972). See also, D. KELLEY & R. DONWAY, LAISSEZ PARLER:
FREEDOM IN THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA 19 (1983) [hereinafter KELLEY & DONWAY].
52. 25 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 212-15. See also, KELLEY & DONWAY, supra note 51, at 22.
But the FCC is again giving signs that it may be about to back off from its lowered
regulatory profile. In the face of a strong decision from the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit that declared an earlier FCC must-carry rule invalid as an invasion of first
amendment rights, Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied sub nom., National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 106 S.
Ct. 2889 (1986), the Commission on August 7, 1986 announced its intention to adopt a
new mandatory carriage rule. FCC News, MM Docket 85-349. In the same announce-
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the greatest threat to cable's potential is at the local level,
through the franchise process and the countless restraints that
the process sustains.53 To a significant extent, the local regula-
tory interest was stirred by the FCC's drawing back in the 1972
Cable Report and by the agency's obvious sense of relief at being
able to hand off a variety of functions to local levels of govern-
ment. Thus, for example, the Commission noted that "the rapid
expansion of the cable television industry [had] led to overlap-
ping and sometimes incompatible regulations" at the federal and
local levels. 4 The Commission considered the federal pre-emp-
tion of cable regulation but rejected it out of a stated concern
that federal licensing "would place an unmanageable burden on
the Commission. ' 55 For that reason and because it was also
maintained that "local governments are inescapably involved in
the process because cable makes use of streets and ways and be-
cause local authorities are able to bring a special expertness to
such matters, for example, as how best to parcel large urban ar-
eas into cable districts," the FCC opted for what it called "crea-
tive federalism" and "structured dualism," both of which trans-
late into dividing up the regulatory turf.56 The Commission
retained control over signal carriage" and program exclusivi-
ties 58 (matters of obviously high concern to the broadcast televi-
sion constituency) and turned over for local administration the
chaos of such aspects as franchise bidding, subscriber rates and
ment, the Commission also unveiled (Fact Sheet accompanying FCC News of August 7)
its plans to examine the possibility of reinstating its former syndicated program exclusiv-
ity rules and to study the compulsory copyright license that the Congress made available
to cable beginning in 1978 to cover the carriage of broadcast signals. All of this may be
suggesting that the FCC is in an ascendant phase in its roller-coaster regulatory attitude
toward cable.
53. See CATO Institute, supra note 2. See also, Comments of James C. McKinney,
Mass Media Bureau Chief at Federal Communication Bar Association, in Washington,
D.C. 6 (Oct. 18, 1983):
Unless we take that task [FCC pre-empt local regulation], the marketplace
will be strewn with local regulatory waste and abuse .... Frankly, I believe we can
either pre-empt now or pre-empt later when local regulators strangle innovative
local communications service and the federal government has to step in to protect
the national communication system.
54. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 204 (1972).
55. Id. at 207.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 170-72.
58. Id. at 181-85.
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rate changes, service complaint procedures, franchise fees, con-
struction timetables, and the like. 9
Over time, the FCC's deferral to the local process and its
willingness to let state and municipal governments prevail grew
into a process that became almost a national scan-
dal" - "cronyism,"6 over-promising e2 "pork barrel politics,"63
and extortion6 are some of the less flattering characterizations
that have been applied to the local process. Another observer
has labeled "virtually all franchising decisions" as "intensely po-
litical," at its worst embracing "improper influence, bribery, and
conspiracy. '65 Even those disposed to championing the munici-
pal rationale for current franchising practices freely admit that:
"The cable operator normally agrees to limitations and controls
(for example, rate regulation and specified service criteria) that
are not normally imposed by municipalities on other local busi-
nesses."66 The way the system works is described as a partner-
ship between the municipality and the cable company, with the
city preventing other cable firms from entering the market.6 7 In
exchange for what is in fact an exclusive franchise, local govern-
ments extract extensive concessions.68
The symbiotic relationship between overreaching local regu-
lators and their monopoly clients did not evolve without chal-
lenge. The challenge did not come from the mainstream of the
cable industry, which has been absorbed with playing the
franchise game in order to get on with the business of wiring the
nation, but rather from free-speech voices69 that for years have
59. Id. at 207-10.
60. Cohen, Cable-Television Firms and Cities Haggle Over Franchises That Trail
Expectations, Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1983, at 34, col. 1 [hereinafter Cable-Television
Firms].
61. Wash. Post, May 20, 1984, Outlook section, at 1.
62. See Cable-Television Firms, supra note 60.
63. Id.
64. CABLEVIsIoN, Dec. 7, 1981, at 128 (quoting Preferred Communications counsel
Harold Farrow).
65. Lee, Cable Franchising and the First Amendment, 36 VAND. L. REv. 867, 870
(1983) [hereinafter Cable Franchising and the First Amendment].
66. See A GUIDE FOR LOCAL POLICY supra, note 48, at 5.
67. Lee, A Regulatory Lock Box on Cable TV, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1984, at 32, col. 3
[hereinafter Regulatory Lock Box].
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Cable Franchising and the First Amendment, supra note 65, at 868-
[Vol. 7:1
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss1/1
PREFERRED COMMUNICATIONS
been patiently questioning the legality of the process." ° The ju-
dicial process has, however, been painfully slow. With both local
governments and the cable industry benefitting from the status
quo of current franchising practices, a cooperative dedication
emerged to seek a legislative solution that would preserve for
each side the principal benefits of their uneasy bond.
The legislative momentum was moved into high gear by
agreements between the cities and cable operators that were
reached in March 1983,71 May 1984,72 and September 1984.73
The entire process was accelerated by local government appre-
hensions resulting from the Supreme Court's decision in Capital
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp 4 (sharply curtailing state and local
authority to interfere with cable programming on the basis of
FCC pre-emption) and by the FCC's affirmation of its decision
in In re Community Cable TV, Inc.7 5 (restricting local regula-
tion of rates to tiers that include must-carry broadcast signals).
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 198471 (the Cable
Act) passed the House and Senate by voice vote on October 11,
1984, and went into effect on December 29, 1984. The Cable
Act consists of a set of amendments to the Communications Act
of 1934, adding a new "Cable Communications" title (now sub-
chapter V-A). 7 8 Section 521 states the purposes of the new legis-
lation as follows:
69.
70. Lloyd, Franchising Under Free-Speech Attack, CABLE T.V. LAW & FINANCE,
June, 1984, at 1 (relying on, for example, Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553
(N.D. Cal. 1984)).
71. PK Cable TV Franchising, Nov. 1, 1984, at 4.
72. Letter from Negotiators for National League of Cities-U.S. Conference of May-
ors (NLC-USCM) and National Cable Television Association (NCTA) to John Dingell,
Chairman, House Committee on Energy and Commerce (May 30, 1984).
73. Letter from Alan Beals, James P. Mooney, and J. Thomas Cochran to John
Dingell, Chairman, House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Sept. 27, 1984).
74. 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
75. 54 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1351 (1983), af'd, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 735 (1984).
76. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2379 (1984).
77. "Not a single member rose to challenge the bill's fundamental assumption that
cable TV is not fully protected by the First Amendment." See Regulatory Lock Box,
supra note 67.
78. The Cable Act designated a new Title VI. But, as codified in Title 47 of the
United States Code, the Cable Act designations and section numbers have been changed
from the 600 series and renumbered in the 500 series.
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(1) establish a national policy concerning cable
communications;
(2) establish franchise procedures and standards which en-
courage the growth and development of cable systems and which
assure that cable systems are responsive to the needs and inter-
ests of the local community;
(3) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and
local authority with respect to the regulation of cable systems;
(4) assure that cable communications provide and are en-
couraged to provide the widest possible diversity of information
sources and services to the public;
(5) establish an orderly process for franchise renewal which
protects cable operators against unfair denials of renewal where
the operator's past performance and proposal for future perform-
ance meet the standards established by this subchapter; and
(6) promote competition in cable communications and mini-
mize unnecessary regulation that would impose an undue eco-
nomic burden on cable systems.7"
At the heart of the Cable Act is the ratification of the au-
thority of municipal governments to control market entry; thus,
with minor exceptions, "a cable operator may not provide cable
service without a franchise."8 0 Cities are specifically given au-
thority to "award . . . 1 or more franchises" within their jurisdic-
tions.8 1 The legislative history declares that the authority to
award confers on the local process the discretion to deal with
such matters as terms and conditions of the franchise (i.e., dura-
tion of franchise, extent of service area), system construction
and operating terms (extension of service, construction timeta-
ble, safety standards), and enforcement and administration (re-
porting requirements, bonds, insurance),.2
The Cable Act is intended to put an end to the uncertainty
that attends the jurisdictional questions and to establish a com-
prehensive regulatory scheme.8 3 But, it appears to leave open
79. 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. III 1985).
80. 47 U.S.C. § 541(b) (Supp. III 1985).
81. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
82. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4655, 4696.
83. Id. at 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 4655, 4656; see also
47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. III 1985).
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nearly as many questions as it resolves."' To summarize the
principal provisions, the Cable Act: 1) establishes the authority
of local governments to regulate cable television through the
franchise process;8 5 2) allows municipalities to collect franchise
fees of up to five percent of the cable operator's gross revenues,
thereby eliminating FCC restrictions on such fees up to the five-
percent limit;86 3) terminates local rate regulation after two
years unless the FCC finds that the cable system in the particu-
lar area is not subject to effective competition;" 4) requires the
set-aside of channels for lease by persons who have no affiliation
with the cable operator and who desire to provide video pro-
gramming over the system;88 5) allows franchising authorities
discretion to insist on cable system access channels, without
limit, for public, educational, and government use; 9 6) estab-
lishes restrictions on the ownership of a cable system by the
owners of a local television station or by local telephone compa-
nies and their affiliates;90 7) defines procedures and require-
ments by which cable operators may obtain modifications of
franchise provisions that relate to services, facilities, or equip-
ment;91 8) creates procedures and fixes standards that cable op-
erators and franchising authorities may invoke in connection
with franchise renewal decisions (Although there is no presump-
tion of renewal specified, a franchising authority's discretion is
limited by the stated criteria.);92 9) grants cities affirmative au-
84. See CABLE FRANCHISING AND REGULATION, supra note 21; Cable Television Law
(MB) (Spec. Supp. 1985).
85. 47 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. Il 1985).
86. 47 U.S.C. § 542 (Supp. Il 1985).
87. 47 U.S.C. § 543 (Supp. 11 1985). Following passage of the Act, the FCC defined
effective competition as the presence of three or more unduplicated broadcast television
signals in the franchise market. Report and Order in MM Docket 84-1296, 58 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1 (1985).
88. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (Supp. 11 1985).
89. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (Supp. Il1 1985).
90. 47 U.S.C. § 533 (Supp. Il1 1985).
91. 47 U.S.C. § 545 (Supp. III 1985).
92. 47 U.S.C. § 546 (Supp. 11 1985). Standards are whether:
(A) the cable operator has substantially complied with the material terms of
the existing franchise and with applicable law;
(B) the quality of the operator's service, including signal quality, response to
consumer complaints, and billing practices, but without regard to the mix, quality,
or level of cable services or other services provided over the system, has been rea-
sonable in light of community needs;
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thority to require upgrading of facilities and channel capacity
during the renewal process;93 10) specifies how a buy-back price
for the system will be arrived at in cases where a franchise is not
renewed and the franchising authority purchases the system or
effects a mandatory transfer of the system to a third party;"' 11)
requires that cable service be made available in all parts of the
franchise area; 5 12) requires a cable operator to establish a pro-
gram to ensure equal employment opportunities in all aspects of
its employment policies and practices and seemingly codifies ex-
isting FCC policies (which rely on goals and timetables to com-
pel cable operators to reach for local workforce parity);96 and 13)
provides for the regulation and restriction of certain kinds of
cable programming. 7 For example, one section gives the
franchising authority power to restrict leased access program-
ming that, in the judgment of the franchising authority, is "ob-
scene" or "in conflict with community standards in that it is
lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent or is otherwise unprotected
by the Constitution of the United States."' Another section al-
lows cable operators and franchising authorities to specify in a
franchise or renewal that certain cable services "shall not be
(C) the operator has the financial, legal, and technical ability to provide the
services, facilities, and equipment as set forth in the operator's proposal; and
(D) the operator's proposal is reasonable to meet the future cable-related
community needs and interests, taking into account the cost of meeting such
needs and interests.
93. 47 U.S.C. § 546(b)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
94. 47 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. III 1985).
95. 47 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. III 1985).
96. 47 U.S.C. § 554 (Supp. III 1985). For a discussion of FCC policies, see Report
and Order Docket 20829, 44 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 839 (1978). See also Report and Order
in MM Docket 85-61, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1572 (1985).
97. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. Although the Act minces around
the subject, it is clear that the target is adult programming that may be locally objection-
able even when it does not meet the strict obscenity standards. See, H.R. REP. No. 934,
98th Cong. 2d Sess. 95, 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, 4655,
4732, 4706 (("pornographic programming"), ("indecent" speech)). The "otherwise unpro-
tected" standard is aimed at holding open for local discretion the power to ban "inde-
cent" programming in the event new court decisions expand the types of speech that
may be restricted. Id. ("This provision would also permit changing constitutional inter-
pretations to be incorporated into the standard set forth in § 624(d)(1) [now codified at
47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(1) (Supp. II 1985)], should those judicial interpretations at some
point in the future deem additional standards, such as indecency, constitutionally valid
as applied to cable.").
98. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. III 1985).
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provided" if they are "obscene or are otherwise unprotected by
the Constitution of the United States."'99 Yet another section
creates a new criminal penalty for the transmission over any
cable system of "matter which is obscene or otherwise unpro-
tected by the Constitution of the United States." 100
VI. The Cable Act and Preferred Communications: Collision
Course?
The Cable Act was only months old when the Ninth Circuit
issued its decision in Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles, raising the possibility that municipal franchising of
cable, as it is currently and typically practiced, is an actionable
intrusion on the first amendment rights of cable operators. The
case holds intriguing implications for the frailty of the Cable
Act. The Ninth Circuit opinion, for example, went out of its way
to express clear skepticism about the validity of key features of
the Act. The court stated: "We note, however, that the
mandatory access and leased access requirements contained in
the City's franchising scheme and called for by §§ 611-612 [now
renumbered as §§ 531-5321 of the Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, 2782-85, pose
particularly troubling constitutional questions." 01
VII. Resolution of Conflicts Compounded by Cable Industry
Ambivalence and Search for its Own Identity
The reaction of the cable television industry to these goings-
on has been one of uncertainty. The industry seems to be in an
internal struggle to identify its own common goals and to knit
its divergent interests into a uniform fabric. It went all out to
support the passage of the Cable Act that blesses the local
franchising process. 02 Thus, an industry that has for most of its
99. 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
100. 47 U.S.C. § 559 (Supp. I1 1985).
101. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1401 n.4
(1985).
102. The professional management at the top of the National Cable Television As-
sociation was in transition during 1984. But both the outgoing and new presidents de-
clared their dedication to the passage of cable legislation. See Turnover at the Top for
NCTA, BROADCASTING, Apr. 9, 1984, at 34 (outgoing president: "I am personally commit-
ted to passage of this bill."; incoming president: "I sleep and dream about it [the bill].").
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growing years been beset by the restraining hand of government
at both the federal and local levels, nevertheless found itself in
late 1984 participating in a political process to bring down on
itself and to legitimize the very franchising practices that are at
the heart of local repression. At the same time, the industry was
proclaiming its devotion to full free-speech entitlements 0 3 and,
in early 1985,104 was applauding the landmark decision of the
Ninth Circuit in Preferred Communications - a case that is
viewed as a big advance toward the goals of identifying cable
television as a first amendment speaker, of eventually undoing
the franchising process that has served to perpetuate practices
that impede cable's march to full status as a publisher and fear-
less community voice, and of peeling back the layers of local in-
tervention that are now enshrined in the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984.
The dedication of the cable industry's national leadership to
passage of cable legislation that endorsed and validated local
franchising practices seems curiously inconsistent with the cable
experience that was compiled during a long history that has
been described as near war between cable operators and local
regulating authorities.10 5 The plausible explanation is that cable
leadership made an important election and committed the in-
dustry to supporting legislation that held out the promise of in-
sulating existing operators from competition. That, of course, is
what the Cable Act figured to accomplish because it would ratify
and perpetuate the existing franchising and franchise renewal
practices which serve to maintain exclusive licensing.
In bargaining for the promise of local monopoly, cable's
support of legislation that validates local licensing and regula-
tion has required a trading away and a giving in to local govern-
ment in such areas as franchise fees for the privilege of doing
business (now sanctioned by the Act and not required to be tied
to the cost of regulation),106 guaranteed public access to the use
of cable channels (free of editorial control by the cable operator
103. Allen Surprise Choice as NCTA Chairman, BROADCASTING, Apr. 9, 1984, at 35
(hereinafter Allen Surprise Choice].
104. Cable Claims First Amendment Victory, BROADCASTING, Mar. 11, 1985, at 50.
105. See Cable-Television Firms, supra note 60, at 34.
106. 47 U.S.C. § 542 (Supp. III 1985).
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and expected typically to be free of charge to users),'10 7 and
mandatory set-asides of cable channels that are required to be
held for leasing by third party programmers (without regard to
the preferences of the cable operator).10 But, the nature of the
relinquishments that the cable industry yielded up seems clearly
to mark a concession by cable that it stands somewhere below
newspapers on the publishing ladder. 10 9 In the circumstance, the
concurrent devotion to "establishing cable's First Amendment
rights" 1 0 seems irresolute. Passage of the Cable Act would ap-
pear, at the very least, to complicate the task of establishing
cable's first amendment rights. The final irony is that the Pre-
ferred Communications case may eventually deny the monopoly
prize that cable's national leaders bargained for and may offer
up as a reality the unspeakable - the notion of competition. It
is becoming evident, however, that the industry could never be
protected from that risk.'
107. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (Supp. I 1985).
108. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (Supp. III 1985).
109. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983) (special state use tax against newspapers violates first amendment);
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state statute granting
political candidate right of access to newspaper space in order to reply to criticism by
newspaper violates the first amendment guarantee of a free press); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (state license tax based on gross receipts of newspapers
precluded by fourteenth amendment).
110. See Allen Surprise Choice, supra note 103, at 35 (statement by Edward M.
Allen, NCTA Chairman-elect).
111. At the very least, telephone companies now seem poised to re-enter the cable
business. For example, a Petition for Declaratory Ruling, for Rule Making, and for Insti-
tution of § 403 Inquiry has been pending with the FCC since it was filed on February 13,
1984. That pleading includes a letter from Pacific Telephone, dated May 26, 1983, that
bluntly states:
Pacific Telephone is now exploring the possibility of taking part in the cable
television industry. As part of its investigation, Pacific is looking at areas with new
or renewing cable television franchises, including Palo Alto.
Pacific's interest in cable television is consistent with its views expressed
before the California Public Utilities Commission in OIl 83-02-01. As Pacific told
the Commission, it wishes to investigate many business opportunities and, at the
same time, preserve its sole provider status.
History records that only through the active intervention of the FCC was the tele-
phone industry prevented from using its monopoly control of utility poles to take com-
plete domination over the emerging cable television technology. The intervention by the
Commission manifested itself in a holding that channel service (a device by which tele-
phone built the plant and leased channel space to the cable operator) was an interstate
offering that required the filing of tariffs (Common Carrier Tariffs for CATV Sys., 4
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The other side of that coin is that Preferred Communica-
tions now casts doubt on the survivability of the core practices
of local franchising. What it comes down to for the cable indus-
try, this early in the life of the Preferred Communications litiga-
tion, is whether the open door to competition is a fair price to
pay for the live prospect that public access, leased access,
franchise fees, and all the overseeing by local government built
into the current franchising process are now available to legal
challenge. 12 And they may be challenged without fear of reprisal
because if anything can be said to emerge clearly from Preferred
Communications, it is the prospect that a win will mean that
F.C.C.2d 257 (1966)), in a decision that the construction by telephone companies of facil-
ities for cable television service required FCC approval under Section 214 of the Commu-
nications Act (General Tel. Co. of Cal., 13 F.C.C.2d 448 (1968), aff'd, 413 F.2d 390 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969)), and in the adoption of a rule barring telephone
ownership and operation of a cable television system within the telephone company's
exchange area (Final Report and Order in Docket 18509, 21 F.C.C.2d 307 (1970), aff'd
sub nom. General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. FCC, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971)). The Cable
Act (47 U.S.C. § 533 (Supp. III 1985)) codifies FCC rules and bars telephone companies
and their affiliates from providing video programming services directly to subscribers in
their telephone service areas.
All of this containment of telephone appears to be on the verge of disintegrating. In
the guise of encouraging competition, the FCC announced (on the day it declared its
intention to reinstate the compulsory carriage of local broadcast stations), that it had
instructed its staff "to prepare a Notice of Inquiry to obtain information on the question
of the restriction on cable ownership placed on local exchange telephone companies, to
develop possible legislative proposals, if appropriate." FCC NEWS, MM Docket No. 85-
349, Aug. 7, 1986, Fact Sheet, at 2. The signs are clear that the FCC means to employ the
proceeding on the Notice of Inquiry to start the process of reversing its own ban on
telephone/cable cross-ownership and to trigger congressional interest in reversing the
statutory hurdle on telephone re-entry that is built into the Cable Act. See Telco Owner-
ship NOI Revives Old Cable Nightmare, BROADCASTING, Aug. 18, 1986, at 37, 38 (report-
ing that FCC Chairman Fowler has declared that there is no reason cable operators
should not face direct competition, and that telcos are "the most likely immediate poten-
tial competitors").
112. If the Preferred Communications litigation eventuates in a conferring on cable
television of first amendment rights equivalent to those customarily enjoyed by the print
media, a substantial number of the legislative compromises that were built into the 1984
Cable Act are questionable. For example, the rate regulation in 47 U.S.C. § 543 (Supp.
III 1985), the mandatory dedication of channels for public, educational, governmental,
and commercial leased access in 47 U.S.C. § 531 (Supp. III 1985), gross revenue franchise
fees in 47 U.S.C. § 542 (Supp. III 1985), the prospect of denial of franchise fees in 47
U.S.C. § 546 (Supp. III 1985), the requirement of 47 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. III 1985) to
serve low-income areas are among those that are constitutionally suspect. See Minneapo-
lis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. PUC of Cal., 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986).
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cities can no longer retaliate against an existing operator. In that
sense, Preferred Communications also is a threat to the cities of
the loss of their leverage at franchise renewal time. If a willing
cable operator cannot be excluded from the market, it follows
that a renewal applicant need no longer be concerned with hav-
ing to justify its continued presence in the market. In that sense,
then, Preferred Communications offers to the cable industry a
more bankable prospect of renewal expectancy than does the
now suspect Cable Act, one of the purposes of which is to "es-
tablish an orderly process for franchise renewal"' 1 3 by setting up
procedures and safeguards against unfair denials, 14 but which
does not establish any guarantee or any "presumption in favor
of renewal. 1 15
The FCC, the cities, and now the Congress have had their
turns and have produced something less than a model climate
for the full development of the promising new technology of
cable television. It is now up to the courts to sort out the tangle.
But, because institutions once established give ground only stub-
bornly, the machinery of franchising and the bureaucracy it sup-
ports may be expected to draw out the process of judicial
testing.
113. 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. III 1985).
114. 47 U.S.C. § 546 (Supp. III 1985).
115. See CABLE FRANCHISING AND REGULATION, supra note 21, at 11-35.
19861
25
